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Abstract
Cross-national comparative analysis of generalised social trust in 60 countries shows that it
is associated with, and is an integral part of, a tight syndrome of cultural, social, economic,
and political variables. High trust countries are characterized by ethnic homogeneity,
Protestant religious traditions, good government, wealth (GDP per capita), and income
equality. This particular combination is most marked in the high trust Nordic countries but
when this group of outliners is removed from the analysis, the same general pattern is found
in the remaining 55 countries, albeit in a weaker form. There are indications that rural societies
tend to have comparatively low levels of generalized trust but no evidence that large-scale
urban society tends to undermine trust.
The cause and effect relations between trust and its correlates are impossible to specify but
the results suggest that the ethnic homogeneity and Protestant traditions have a direct impact
on trust, and an indirect one through their consequences for good government, wealth and
income equality. The importance of ethnic homogeneity for generalised trust also suggests
that the difference between particularised and generalised trust may be one of degree rather
than kind.
Generalisiertes Vertrauen in die Mitmenschen ist eng verknüpft mit einem Syndrom kultu-
reller, sozialer, wirtschaftlicher und politischer Kontextmerkmale. Dies zeigt eine kompara-
tive Makro-Analyse mit 60 Ländern, basierend auf dem World Value Survey und Makro-
Indikatoren. Insbesondere ethnische Homogenität, protestantische religiöse Tradition, hohe
Regierungsqualität, Wohlstand und Einkommensgleichheit begünstigen ein hohes generali-
siertes Vertrauen der Bevölkerung. Diese Merkmale finden sich in Kombination – und
besonders ausgeprägt – in den nordischen Ländern, die auch die höchsten Vertrauenswerte
aufweisen. Doch selbst wenn man die nordischen Länder als Ausreißer in der Analyse nicht
berücksichtigt, sind für die verbleibenden 55 Länder dieselben Determinanten von Vertrauen
wirksam, wenn auch in abgeschwächter Form.
Zwar können die genauen Ursache-Wirkungszusammenhänge zwischen Vertrauen und
den genannten Ländermerkmalen nicht spezifiziert werden. Jedoch legen die Ergebnisse
nahe, dass ethnische Homogenität und Protestantismus zum einen auf direktem Wege ein
Klima des Vertrauens erzeugen, zum anderen auf indirektem Wege, indem sie die Regie-
rungsqualität, die wirtschaftliche Entwicklung und Einkommensverteilung beeinflussen. Die
Bedeutung ethnischer Homogenität für Vertrauen wirft auch die Frage auf, ob zwischen
partikularisiertem und generalisiertem Vertrauen wirklich – wie oft angenommen – ein
fundamentaler Unterschied besteht oder ob dieser nicht eher gradueller Natur ist.
PAGE 2
SOCIAL TRUST: GLOBAL PATTERN OR NORDIC EXCEPTIONALISM?
Contents
1 Introduction  ....................................................................................................     3
2 Theories of the origins of social trust  ........................................................     5
3 Data and methods  ........................................................................................    11
4 Results  .............................................................................................................    14
5 Nordic exceptionalism?  ...............................................................................     24
6 Conclusion  .....................................................................................................     27
Notes
Appendix: Methods
References
PAGE 3
JAN DELHEY, KENNETH NEWTON
1 Introduction
Social trust takes three main forms. Particularised trust, sometimes called ‘thick’ or personal
trust is strongest in small, face-to-face communities where people know each other well and
interact closely on a daily basis, and where trustworthy behaviour can be reinforced by strong
social sanctions made possible by closure around group boundaries (Gambetta 1988, Portes
and Landholt 1996, Portes and Sensenbrenner 1993). Instrumental or calculating trust,
sometimes referred to as tit-for-tat trust, is based on rational, cost-benefit calculations about
self interest (Arrow 1972, Hardin 1993, Ridley 1997). The third type, ‘thin’ or impersonal or
generalised trust, is more common in modern large-scale urban society where social ties are
often weaker but more extensive (Granovetter 1973), where society is more differentiated and
heterogeneous, where life can be more competitive, and populations more mobile. This form
of trust between strangers and aquaintances is more difficult to understand and explain than
the thick trust of closed communities, and the calculating trust of rational-choice theory. Why
should we trust people we barely know, when sanctions are relatively weak, and when it is
comparatively easy to get away with untrustworthy behaviour? Nevertheless, it is generally
agreed that generalized social trust is an essential ‘synthetic force’ in modern society (Simmel
1950), but this only makes its origins and explanations the more puzzling.
There are also three main approaches to the explanation of generalized social trust. A
social-psychological school sees it as an integral part of a personality syndrome (Erikson
1950; Rosenberg 1956, 1957; Allport 1961; Cattell 1965; Uslaner 1999, 2002) that is
developed in early childhood socialization and tends to change only slowly thereafter. Others
also treat it as an individual characteristic but not as the result of childhood socialization. They
either see it as an outcome of individual self interest, or as the product of individual
circumstances associated with such things as class, income, education, gender, ethnicity, and
age (Orren 1997; Brehm and Rahn 1997; Patterson 1999; Newton 1999a; Whiteley 1999).
A third school sees trust not as an individual property but as a collective characteristic of social
relations (Luhmann 1979; Bourdieu 1983; Coleman 1988, Giddens 1990) that is sustained
by cultures, communities, and social institutions.
Trust probably works on all three levels, and in this sense it is a multi-level concept
(Weatherford 1992), but this article focuses on the third; it is concerned with the explanation
of different levels of trust across the countries of the world. There are both empirical and
theoretical reasons for following this research strategy. Empirically, the results of individual
level research have not always been particularly strong or impressive. For example, while
there is evidence of variation in trust between different social groups, the correlations are
usually rather weak and patchy, they vary from one country to another, or one time period to
another, and the variance explained by regressions equations is often rather low (see, for
example, Patterson 1999; Whiteley 1999; Costa and Kahn 2002: 6; Alesina and La Ferrara
2002: 221; Delhey and Newton 2003).
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Theoretically, there are good reasons for interpreting trust not so much as an individual
property that people ‘have’ or ‘carry around’ with them, but as something based on how
people evaluate the society they live in. When individuals response to the standard survey
question by saying that they trust others, they are not so much making a statement about
themselves as about the trustworthiness of others. In this sense trust is a collective property
(Putnam 2000: 138; Newton 2001: 203-4; Van der Meer 2003) that can be explained at
collective levels. According to this view, trust can be a top-down phenomenon that is created
and sustained by cultures, communities, and institutions that make it both possible and rational
for the individuals within them to behave in a trusting and trustworthy manner (Levi 1996;
Tarrow 1996; Foley, Edwards 1996; Rothstein 2000; Maloney, Smith, and Stoker 2001: 96).
People express trust or distrust to varying degrees because daily experience suggests that
others generally behave in a trustworthy or untrustworthy manner.
This raises the difficult problem of the definition and interpretation of trust. Fortunately,
for our purposes it is not necessary to go deeply into the complexities of the conceptual debate
surrounding the meaning of trust (see, for example, Baier 1986; Misztal 1996; Hardin 1993,
1996; Seligman 1997; Hollis 1998; Warren 1999). It is sufficient to treat generalised social
trust as the basic feeling that others will not deliberately do us harm, at worst, or will try to look
after our interests, at best. Trust is about the feeling that we are unlikely to be mugged or raped
in the streets, cheated in shops, exploited at work, served unjustly by police, courts, and public
bureaucrats, deceived by politicians and other elites, or lied to by neighbours and acquaint-
ances. This is close to Hardin’s (1998: 12-15) definition of trust as ‘encapsulated interest’, to
Gambetta’s (1988: 217) suggestion that it is built upon the belief that others will act
beneficially rather than maliciously towards us, and Warren’s (1999: 311) that trust involves
lack of malice and shared interests. The main question asked here is what sorts of societal
circumstances breed trust and distrust?
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2 Theories of the origins of social trust
Conflict and cleavages
The more others are like us in terms of social identity and characteristics, and the more they
share our interests, the more trustworthy our behaviour towards them is likely to be. If trust
is built upon common bonds, then the more homogeneous a society the higher its trust level
is likely to be, and the more it is divided by cleavage and social difference, the more conflictual
and the less trustful it is likely to be. To the extent that most social cleavages in modern society
are formed around class, religion, language, and ethnicity, we expect the more divided they
are along these lines, the lower their level of generalised social trust are likely to be. There is
support for this proposition in research showing that ethnic homogeneity and income equality
are strongly associated with trust (Knack and Keefer 1997; Briggs 1997; Uslaner 2000: 580;
Paxton 2002; Alesina and La Ferrara 2002; Costa and Kahn 2002; Helliwell 2003). Our
measures of cleavage cover income inequality (as a class measure), and ethnic and religious
composition.1
Social strain and disruption: Anomia and public safety
Generalised trust is likely to be associated with social stability, integration and peace; distrust
is likely to accompany many forms of social disturbance, disruption, and conflict. We have
five measures of the latter, ranging from the mild to the severe. The mildest, the lethal accident
rate, is included because a society that disregards the safety of others (driving dangerously,
a disregard for public health and safety rules, constructing unsafe bridges or buildings) is
likely to breed distrust. A safe society is one that takes care of others, which is to say, a society
where we can put our own safety in the hands of others with some confidence of low risk.
The suicide rate is a second measure, included on the grounds that anomie and acute
personal distress may be associated with distrust. Similarly a high murder (homicide) rate
implies anomic behaviour. Most extreme , however, is civil war since armed internal conflict
means the breakdown of social institutions and social order to some degree. Not all conflict,
however, will be associated with distrust: conflict with an external enemy is more likely to
draw society together and increase trust. The proposition tested here, therefore, is that internal
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(civil) war is likely to be associated with lower levels of trust within a society, whereas external
(foreign) war will tend to improve trust. The more recent the war, the greater its impact on trust
is likely to be. Our measures, therefore, take account of internal and external wars, and the
time elapsed since their conclusion.
Economic development and modernisation
Wealth is positively related to social trust, but more strongly at the cross-national than at the
individual level (Knack and Keefer 1997; Inglehart 1999; Paxton 2002). A casual inspection
of the comparative figures (Table 1) shows that some of the wealthiest OECD countries rank
at the top, while the poorest are often found at the very bottom. Perhaps the most striking
example of trust levels tracking economic development is post-war West Germany where the
trust score rose from 9% in 1948 to 45% in 1993 (Cusack 1997). Factors other than the
wirtschaftswunder help to account for this steady long-term increase, but rising per capita
incomes seem to play a part.
A statistical association between wealth and trust tells us nothing about the mechanisms
underlying the link. One possibility is that wealthier individuals and countries may be in a
more secure position to take the risks that trust involves, while, at the same time, their
command of resources make it less necessary to act in an untrustworthy manner (Banfield
1958: 110). Another possible causal link, however, is that wealthier countries educate their
populations to a higher level, and that education is associated with liberal and trusting
attitudes. Many studies find an association between education and trust at the individual level
(e.g. Knack and Keefer 1997: 1279; Putnam 2000; Uslaner 2002. But see also Delhey and
Newton 2003). Therefore, we include school enrolment as an important independent variable
that is not the same as wealth, but closely related to it.
A third possible link between wealth and trust is that it is not money, as such, that matters,
but a wide array of factors that most generally accompany economic development and
modernization: wealthy societies are generally urban and largely non-agricultural. Our
measures of modernisation are the degree of urbanisation, the size of the agricultural sector,
and life expectancy. There is no reasons to regard life expectancy to be directly associated
with high levels of trust (although the more trusting may live longer) and it is used here as an
indicator of modernisation, which may be associated with generalised trust.
It should also be noted that the relationship between modernisation and social trust may be
the exact reverse of our hypothesis. If it is true, as many claim, that modern large-scale society
tends to breed alienation, anomie, and competition or aggression between individuals, then
it will be associated with distrust rather than trust.2  Therefore, population size and density are
included in the analysis.3
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Finally, on the topic of economic development, it may not be wealth that matters so much
as income equality (Alesina and La Ferrara 2002). Perhaps individualist, free-market,
competitive societies with higher Gini indexes tend to have lower levels of trust than
collectivist welfare states whose redistribution of income and resources encourages a sense
of egalitarian citizenship and shared identities and interests. This leads us back to the
hypotheses presented earlier that suggests using income equality as a measure of class
cleavage.
Democracy and good government
The more democratic a nation the more trusting its population is likely to be (Knack and
Keefer 1997; Inglehart 1999; Newton 2001; Booth and Richard 2001: 55; Paxton 2002).
Once again the reason is not clear and it is probably not simple. Democracy may encourage
trust between citizens because they are all given the same set of rights and duties, and share
an interest in maintaining the social order and democratic stability. Democratic government
also protects civil rights and liberties and may, therefore, be a source of institutionalised trust
(Weingast 1998: 165; Levi and Stoker 2000: 493).
There is also a paradoxical relationship between trust and democracy in that a distrust of
political power leads democracies to set up institutional arrangements that limit, so far as
possible, the chances of political leaders betraying their trust. These arrangements include,
among others, the division of powers between the three main branches of government,
elections, the rule of law, judicial oversight, a free press, open government, and the constant
scrutiny of political elites. According to this argument, if we trust political leaders, it is not
because they are individually trustworthy (they may or may not be), but because democracies
have a variety of constitutional devices that prevent or discourage untrustworthy and corrupt
behaviour on the part of political elites. Similarly, a wide range of institutional mechanisms
try to maintain the trustworthy and honest behaviour of a wide range of public officials,
especially of judges, police, and civil servants.
Support for this top-down view that governments can affect trust is provided by the east
European countries under Communist rule, which were characterised by low levels of
generalised trust, because of the nature of the regime and social and political climate it created,
but particularised trust among small circles of people who knew and dependent upon each
other (Sztompka 1996; Rose 1994: 29; Rose and Mischler 1997). On the other side of the coin,
research on Sweden’s universal welfare state suggests that it encouraged generalized trust
between citizens, and between citizens and welfare officials, compared with particularistic
welfare systems, which are associated with greater suspicion and distrust (Rothstein and
Stolle, 2003). The importance of government is also underlined by Canadian research
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showing that the impact of ethnic diversity on social trust seems to depend to some extent on
the quality of government and its institutions (Helliwell 2003). In this way, government may
act as an intervening variables between trust and the ethnic factors discussed earlier.
Democracy is embedded in a broader array of institutions than specifically governmental
ones. In the rational-legal order the power of officials of all kinds is strictly limited, their
conduct is rule- bound and impersonal, sanctions are imposed for breaches of trust, the rights
of ordinary citizens are protected, and opportunities for corruption are reduced. This may also
help to create an institutional framework within which trusting attitudes and behaviour can
develop. Public officials are required to treat the public according to universal principles,
which, in turn, encourages the development of citizenship based upon equality, common
interest and identity, and trust.
The size and importance of the public sector means that it has a pervasive influence on the
whole of society, including the private and the market sectors, but the latter also have
mechanisms for policing corrupt and untrustworthy behaviour, including methods of enforc-
ing service standards (e.g. professional ethics), the self-regulation of business practices (e.g.
advertising standards), and the evaluation of a wide range of occupational groups (e.g. the
evaluation of teaching practices in schools and universities). In sum, although they may well
be a double-edged weapon that both reinforce trustworthy behaviour and undermine trust at
the same time (O’Neil 2002), the institutions of democratic society are intended to create a
structure that encourages trustworthy behaviour and punishes corruption and untrustworthi-
ness.
The finding that trust and norms of civic cooperation are stronger in countries with formal
institutions that limit the power of political executives, and that effectively protect property
and contract rights (Knack and Keefer 1997) are consistent with this hypothesis. So also are
the findings that social trust helps to create a taxation system that operates in a fair way (Scholtz
and Lubell 1998), and helps government to provide public services more effectively (Putnam
1993).
According to this theory social trust and democratic government may be involved in a
complicated virtuous circle that helps to resolve collective action problems. In a bottom-up
manner, social trust between citizens enables society to build a set of civil and private
institutions that operate in an impartial and fair way, that protect civil rights and liberties, and
that encourage effective government performance (Pharr, Putnam, and Dalton 2000: 26-7).
At the same time, democratic and effective government, and the fair and impartial operation
of social institutions have a top-down effect of helping to create circumstances in which
trustworthy behaviour is required and respected. We test aspects of this general theory, using
measures of the extent of civil liberties, the quality of government, the provision of public
services measured by the size of public expenditure, and the extent of corruption in public life.
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Voluntary organisations and civil society
Classical theory holds that social trust is generated by individual involvement in voluntary
associations, which act as the free schools of democracy and generate the skills and habits of
the heart associated with democratic culture and practice. However, empirical results are
inconclusive, or no more than weakly supportive of this claim. Much of the research finds little
or no connection among individual members of, or activists in, voluntary organisations and
either trust or democratic attitudes and behaviour (Torcal and Montero 1996; van Deth 1996;
Dekker and van den Broak 1995; Torcal and Montero 1999: 177; Billiet and Cambre 1999:
255; Newton 1999a, 1999b; Whiteley 1999: 40 –1; Uslaner 2000; Booth and Richard 2001:
50; Delhey and Newton 2003). Other work suggests that particular kinds of associations may
promote trust, but that voluntary activity in general does not seem to do so (Stolle and Rochon
1999; Putnam 2000: 22; Paxton 2002, Uslaner 2002).
There is some evidence of an association between voluntary activity and social trust at the
cross-national comparative level (Knack and Keefer 1997: 1281-2), but it is not notably
strong, and in-depth case studies of Germany and Spain find that a strong voluntary network
is neutral towards democracy and may be used or exploited by whatever political groups are
in power, democratic or otherwise (Berman 1997; Encarnacion 2001). To test the role of
voluntary associations in generating trust we develop four measures of voluntary activity
based upon (1) membership of, or (2) activity in one association, and (3) membership of, or
(4) activity in three or more associations.
Religion and culture
Trust may be based on moral precepts (Uslaner 2002) and related to some religious beliefs
and traditions (Knack and Keefer 1997: 1283; Inglehart 1999: 94), although Alesina and La
Ferrara (2002) find that religious beliefs in the USA do not significantly affect trust.  A
religious interpretation of trust of this kind is different from the religious cleavage model
already discussed. The cleavage theory focuses on religious differences and divisions,
whatever the particular religions involved, whereas the religious culture model focuses on the
content of religious beliefs, insofar as these may encourage or discourage generalized social
trust, whether or not there are also religious cleavages involved. In particular, Protestant
beliefs are associated with democracy, equality, a relative absence of corruption, and
strictures about the constant need to behave in a trustworthy and moral manner. It is not clear
what implications other religious beliefs may have for trust, and to explore this matter the
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research includes data on the seven religions that dominate in the countries covered by the
study.
Problems of cause and effect
Before we discuss details of data and methods we should make one last point of a general
theoretical nature concerning the problem of causes and effects. Many have discussed the
issue (see, for example, Levi 1996; Rahn, Brehm, and Carlson 1999; Warren 1999; Paxton
2002; Delhey and Newton 2003), but we have avoided the terms causes, effects, or
consequences and have deliberately used the words ‘association’ or ‘link’ in their place. This
is because in almost every case where there is an association between trust and another
variable, trust may be either a cause, an effect, or both. For example, we hypothesise that
economically equal societies are more trusting because economic differences and cleavages
are reduced, so limiting class conflict and encouraging trusting attitudes and behaviour
between equal citizens. Or perhaps it is the other way round. Perhaps widespread social trust
makes it easier for citizens to redistribute income between themselves (Luttmer 2001, quoted
in Alesina and La Ferrara 2002: 209). Similarly, we hypothesise that wealth is associated with
trust, perhaps because it helps to reduce the risk that goes with trust. Equally, trust may
encourage economic growth, or it may be that both reinforce each other. We will return to this
matter at the end of the paper in the light of the empirical results.
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3 Data and methods
Details of the independent variables included in the study are covered in Appendix 1. The
empirical analysis is based upon data for sixty countries collected from a variety of sources.
Our dependent variable, trust, comes from the World Values Surveys, which ask the classic
question about social trust in more than 60 nations. It also samples populations in some sub-
national regions, but only nation-states are examined here, because it is difficult or impossible
to get other sorts of information (for example, income inequality, homicides, and GNP) for
sub-national populations.
Two waves of the WVS are used: wave II for 1990, and wave III for 1995-7. Trust scores
are available in the WVS III survey for 55 countries; an additional 11 countries are available
from the previous WVS II, giving a total of 66 countries. Since the correlation between trust
scores for those 32 countries for which figures are available in both years is 0.88 (Pearson’s
r, p < .001), stability over short periods of time is evidently high, justifying the use of the 1990
trust scores as a valid proxy for trust scores in the mid-90s.4  However, six of the 66 nations
for which we have trust data had to be excluded from the analysis because other data was
missing, leaving a total of 60 nations for this research.5
The data cover a wide range of countries from all regions of the globe, although most are
drawn from west Europe (17) and east Europe (20). The Americas and Asia are represented
with 12 countries each, Africa with 3, and Oceania with 2 (see Table 1). Our 60 nations are
not a sample of any kind, and given a total of 192 states in the world, it is not even a majority
of the global total. Nevertheless, 60 countries are enough to provide a reliable basis for
statistical analysis and a larger number than previous cross-national studies of social trust;
Knack and Keefer (1997) cover 29 countries, and Paxton (2002) deals with 48.
The questionnaire of the WVS asks the standard, and much tried and tested question:
‘Generally speaking, would you say that most people can be trusted
or that you can’t be too careful in dealing with people?’
In most countries there is a sample of between 1,000 and 2,000 respondents, and in only ten
nations were fewer than a thousand interviewed. The World Values surveys have some
problems, because urban and high income groups tend to be over-represented in some
countries, but these problems do not seriously detract from the randomness of the samples.
The measure of social trust has some deficiencies. First, it is based on only one question
about social trust, albeit the classic one, rather than the more valid and reliable three-item
Rosenberg scale. Second, respondents saying most people can be trusted are scored 1, and
those who say you can’t be too careful are scored 0, which is probably a less sensitive measure
than wider rating scales of, say, 0-4 or 0-10. However, the disadvantage of the scale is reduced
in our work which aggregates individual responses to produce a national average. This
produces a more differentiated measure of trust across countries than the simple zero-one
score for individuals. The highest national score is 65% and the lowest is 3%.
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There may also be some ambiguity about what is meant by ‘most people’ in the World
Values question. Clearly ‘most people’ includes a far wider range of individuals than family,
friends, and immediate neighbours, but how far the circle extends is open to interpretation.
It may be that trusting people extend the boundaries wider than low trust people, or that low
trust people tend to restrict ‘most people’ to those they feel they can trust. In this case, their
definition of ‘most people’ may be influenced by their feelings of trust in the first place. This
objection, however, is speculative, and there is some good evidence to suggest that the
generalized trust question does its work adequately. Uslaner (2000: 575; 2002: 54) finds that
it loads heavily on trust in strangers, and concludes that does measure generalized trust. The
experiment reported by Yamagishi and Yamagishi (1993) also found a correspondence
between trusting attitudes and trusting behaviour (see also the ‘experiment’ reported by
Knack and Keefer 1997: 1257).
A data set was constructed consisting of the aggregate national trust scores, as the
dependent variable, and a wide range of independent social, economic and political variables
collected according to the hypotheses outlined above. Data sources and further explanations
of the indicators used are listed in the Appendix. The data cover:
• Population characteristics - total population and population density. A measure of
foreign born populations (as a possible social cleavage) was not included because of
lack of data.
•· Modernization - degree of urbanization, industrial development (size of the agricul-
tural sector), life expectancy, and education level (secondary net enrolment rate).
• Wealth - GDP per capita in purchasing power parities.
• Civil and political liberties - Freedom House scores for civil liberties and political
rights, a dummy variable for (former or current) communist rule, government expend-
iture on health and education, and four indices of the quality of government.
• Indicators of social disturbance and disruption - suicide rates, rates of lethal acci-
dents, murder rates, and the level of corruption.
• Cleavages and conflicts - ethnic, linguistic and religious fractionalisation, income ine-
quality, and involvement in internal and/or external wars, and their dates.
• Voluntary Organisations - membership of, and activity in voluntary associations (one
and three or more).
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• Religious Culture - dominant religions (Roman Catholic, Protestant, mixed Catholic-
Protestant, Islam, Hindu, and Buddhism).
Some of these variables are constructed from a complex set of indicators (see Appendix). The
resulting list of independent variables is larger and more varied than any used in previous
research on social trust. Inglehart (1999) tests the influence of three social variables, Paxton
(2002) of six, and Knack and Keefer (1997) of eleven.
The quality of indicators
We are aware that some of the indicators are not the most refined measures of the concepts
we have discussed. For example, income inequality, and measures of ethnic, linguistic, and
religious diversity indicate a potential for cleavage based conflict, not actual conflict that is
manifest in the societies. They indicate the presence of structural social characteristics that
could result in conflicts. A case in point is income inequality: there is a wide variation in how
much inequality is acceptable across countries, and any given level may not be a problem in
some places but a source of conflict in another (Delhey 2001). There again, the measure of
civil war is restricted to armed conflict, though the concept includes confrontations that fall
short of para-military combat. Similarly, the murder rate is only one of many forms of criminal
and deviant behaviour that might be associated with trust levels, and, in any case, crime
statistics are notoriously open to criticism, quite apart from the difficulty of comparing them
cross-nationally. Even some of the tried and tested indicators (GNP per capita) are not without
their problems. We try to minimise this problem by factor analysing sets of variables in order
to produce more reliable and valid measures.
Because of the large number of independent variables, the analysis proceeds through two
stages. After looking briefly at the distribution of social trust across the globe, the first stage
examines a large number of bivariate correlations. In the second step, the strongest or
‘winning’ variables from the complete list are used in multivariate analyses.
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4 Results
Trust across the globe
In only six countries do as many as half the population express trust, these being the high-trust
societies of Scandinavia (Norway, Sweden and Denmark), the Netherlands, Canada, and
China (Table 1). Evidently high trust societies are a small minority. A further 21 countries fall
into the medium trust range, mainly the wealthy, OECD nations of western Europe and the
USA, plus three east European countries and India. In this cluster, at least 30% of the
population are trusting. The remaining 39 countries (59% of the total and therefore an absolute
majority of all our 60 nations) have trust scores of under 30% and may be described as low
trust nations. Countries from all world regions are in this cluster, with a concentration in east
Europe and South America. All three African nations are in the grouping. Within this last
category there is a sub-group of very low trust nations, consisting of 6 countries (Macedonia,
Puerto Rico, the Philippines, Turkey, Peru and Brazil) in which fewer than 10% of the
population express trust. To put it the other way round, in these countries more than 90% of
the population do not trust their fellow citizens. They are closer to ‘no-trust’ than ‘low-trust’
societies.
Table 1 shows regional patterns across the globe. The Americas are clearly divided into
the North with high or medium trust, and the Middle and South with low, or virtually no trust.
West European nations generally have fairly high levels, with a few southern countries
(France and Portugal) in the low-trust cluster. Eastern Europe is predominantly a low-trust
area, with only three exceptions (surprisingly, the crisis-ridden countries of Serbia and
Montenegro, and the politically and economically unstable Ukraine). The Asian countries of
our sample are distributed across all clusters, with China, India and the highly industrialized
countries Japan, Taiwan and South Korea in the high to medium grouping, and the Central
Asian republics formerly belonging to the Soviet Union in the lower one. Finally, the two
countries in Oceania (Australia and New Zealand) go with the other wealthy OECD nations
in the medium to high category.
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Table 1: Social trust scores in different world regions (% of population trusting other people)
Source: World Value Surveys 1990, 1996, own computations.
Americas Western  
Europe 
Eastern  
Europe 
Asia Africa Oceania 
More than 50 % trusting (high-trust societies) 
  Norway 65         
  Sweden 60         
  Denmark 58         
Canada 53 Nether- 
lands 
53   China 52     
            
30 % and more trusting (medium-trust societies) 
  Finland 49       N. Zealand 49 
  Ireland 47         
  Iceland 44         
  N. Ireland 44   Japan 42     
  Germany 39   Taiwan 42   Australia 40 
USA. 36 Switzer- 
land 
37   India 38     
  Italy 35         
  Belgium 34         
  Austria 32 Monte- 
negro 
32       
  Britain 30 Ukraine 31 S. Korea 30     
  Spain 30 Serbia 30       
            
10 % and more trusting (low trust societies) 
    Bulgaria  29       
    Czech R. 29       
Mexiko 28   Bosnia 28       
    Albania 27       
Domenica 26   Slovakia 27       
    Latvia 25 Armenia  25     
    Croatia 25       
    Belarus  24       
    Russia 24       
  France 23 Hungary 23   Ghana 23   
  Portugal 22 Estonia  22       
Uruguay 22   Moldova 22 Azerbijan 21     
Chile 21   Lithuania 22 Bangladesh 21     
    Romania 19 Georgia  19 Nigeria 19   
Argentina 18   Poland 18 Pakistan 19     
    Slovenia 16   S. Africa 16   
Venezuela 14           
Colombia 10           
            
Less than 10 % trusting (no-trust societies) 
Puerto  
Rico 
06   Macedonia 08 Philippines 05     
Peru 05     Turkey 05     
Brazil 03           
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Bivariate associations
Table 2 presents the bivariate correlations between generalised social trust and a list of
independent variables selected on the basis of the theory laid out in the first part of the article.
The simple correlations show that of the various cleavage measures, income inequality is most
strongly associated with trusting attitudes. Societies with more equal incomes are substantial-
ly more trusting. At the same time, ethnic fractionalisation shows a strong (negative)
correlation with trust, while linguistic and religious fractionalisation do not. This suggests that
it is not cleavages that matter so much as specifically economic and ethnic cleavages.
No matter which of the three measures of external war is used, it does not correlate
significantly with trust, so there is no evidence here that an external enemy will draw society
together and lift trust levels. A real test of this hypothesis requires longitudinal data rather than
cross-sectional data we employ here, but if there were a time effect we would expect the
correlation between trust and the last year of the war to be significant, and it is not (r = - 0.173).
Internal wars do matter, however, and all four of our measures are negative and statistically
significant. It is noticeable that it makes little difference when the war took place in the 1945-
90 period – whether is it a recent conflict or forty years old. This suggests that it may not be
internal war, as such that is important, but the circumstances associated with war in the first
place. In other words, the internal war measure may be important because it is a good indicator
of deep cleavages in society which exist both before and after the war whenever that may have
occurred.
The wealth and modernisation measures have a mixed but generally strong association
with trust. The figures for GNP per capita are particularly strong, suggesting that wealth and
the benefits it brings are conducive to the development of trusting relations. The figure for
education is highly significant but still substantially smaller than that for wealth, suggesting
perhaps that education is rather less important than money. Moreover, the finding that both
wealth and income inequality matter for trust indicates that money matters for trust more than
most things.
The degree of urbanisation is not significant, but a large agricultural sector is associated
with low levels of generalised trust. Taken together the two figures lend some support for the
idea that modern society does not undermine generalized social trust, but that this form of trust
is not generally compatible with agricultural society. More speculatively, the findings are
consistent with the idea that agricultural societies may have high particular (Portes and
Landholt 1996) but low generalized trust, whereas urban-industrial societies have a neutral
impact on generalized trust. However, to test this proposition we would have to have
measures of particularised and generalised trust and, unfortunately, we have only the latter,
so all we can say from our figures is that the larger the agricultural sector the lower the
generalised trust. The finding that there is no significant association between trust and either
population size or population density, supports the conclusion that modern large scale, urban-
industrial society is not associated with widespread generalised distrust.
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All the measures of democracy and government effectiveness are strongly and positively
associated with high trust, with the single exception of the former/current Communist
countries. They show lower levels of trust, as we expected, but the figure is not significant.
It is worth noting that the positive association with political freedom is substantially higher
when a twenty year period of freedom has accumulated rather than the simply taking account
of the current state of affairs. The last four political measures of political stability, law and
order, rule of law, and government effectiveness, are all closely associated with high trust, a
set of figures consistent with the idea that government structures and performance are linked
to trust. The fact that all four correlations are of almost identical strength suggests, however,
that they measure the same or very similar things.
The figures show that it is not only government structures that matter, but also government
policies and services. There are substantial associations between trust, on the one hand, and
public expenditure on health and education on the other. This is consistent with the idea that
political systems that spend money on education and health help to generate a sense of
citizenship which is associated with trust, while systems that rely more on markets than public
services may be more individualistic, more competitive, and less trustful.
Two measures of social strain and disruption – the suicide and accident rates - do not
correlate with trust. A third measure – the murder rate - is statistically significant but does not
reach the same substantive level as some other variables in the table. Overall, this suggests that
suicide, accident, and murder rates are not good predictors of social trust. However, the fourth
measure of corruption is one of the highest in Table 2. It is not surprisingly that corruption and
distrust are associated since corrupt behaviour is untrustworthy behaviour, but the closeness
of the association stands out, and lends strong support to the idea that corruption in public
places is of great importance for social trust between citizens. If we add to this the finding the
fact that government structures and practices, especially the rule of law, political freedom, and
government effectiveness, are all closely linked with social trust we are lead to the conclusion
that government forms and practices have a close association with generalized social trust.
Active membership of voluntary associations is not important, whereas the figures for
membership of associations are significant, though not as impressive as many others in the
table. Overall, this is not strong evidence to support the idea that voluntary associations
generate trust, but enough to suggest that the membership variable should be included in the
second-stage multivariate analysis.
Finally, the set of figures dealing with religion has only two significant correlations, both
related to Protestantism. Countries that are dominantly Protestant or have a significant
Protestant minority show higher levels of trust than Catholic countries, which served as a
reference. No other religion makes a difference. The initial results concerned with both
cleavages and cultures, therefore, indicate that religion is not of much importance, with the
single exception of Protestant cultures which show higher levels of trust.
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Table 2: Bivariate correlations with generalised social trust
Notes:  * significant at 0.05; ** significant at 0.01; *** significant at 0. 001.
Numbers of observations: 60 countries.
Variable Correlation with social 
trust 
Cleavages and conflicts  
 Cleavages  
 Class (income inequality) -.466** 
 Ethnic fractionalisation -.385** 
 Linguistic fractionalisation -.134 
 Religious fractionalisation .126 
 Conflicts  
 Internal war after 1945, last year of war -.431** 
 Internal war after 1945 (dummy) -.436** 
 Internal war after 1991 (dummy) -.423** 
 Internal war after 1995 (dummy) -.332** 
 External war (Last year of war?)  -.173 
 External war after 1945 (dummy) -.121 
 External war after 1995 (dummy) -.196 
Modernization and Wealth  
 Urbanization .210 
 Agricultural employment -.361** 
 Life expectancy .507** 
 Education – secondary school net enrolment ratio .393** 
 GDP per capita .660** 
 Total population  .187 
 Population density  .034 
Good Government (Democracy and Government 
Effectiveness) 
 
 Freedom House score (Civil and political rights) .394** 
 Freedom House score (cumulated 20 years) .528** 
 Former/current communist (yes/no) -.229 
 Government expenditure on health and education .471** 
 Index of political stability and lack of violence .642** 
 Index of law and order .684** 
 Index of rule of law .683** 
 Index of government effectiveness .641** 
Social climate (anomia and public safety)  
 Suicide rate .030 
 Lethal accidents -.231 
 Murders (homicides) -.381** 
 Corruption level (CPI) -.665** 
Voluntary organizations  
 Voluntary organization membership (yes /no) .372** 
 Voluntary organization membership (3 or more)  .345** 
 Voluntary organization active membership .186 
 Voluntary organization active membership (3 or more) .086 
Religion (ref. Group: Roman Catholic)  
 Mixed Catholic/Protestant (dummy) .287* 
 Protestant (dummy) .432** 
 Orthodox (dummy) -.185 
 Islamic (dummy) -.232 
 Hindu (dummy) .087 
 Buddhist (dummy) .216 
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Multivariate analysis
Bivarariate correlations tell us which variables are not closely associated with trust, leaving
a set of ‘winning’ variables that are employed in the second stage of multivariate analysis.
There are two problems in this second stage, however. In the first place, even 60 cases allow
us to test the power of only a few independent variables simultaneously. Second, many of the
winning variables are strongly correlated with each other (multi-collinearity). For example,
rich countries are generally egalitarian ones with democratic governments, and many of them
have a Protestant background, low rates of corruption, and no internal wars in their recent
history. Many variables are so closely inter-correlated that it is impossible to disentangle their
separate influences by means of regression analysis or causal modeling. These methods have
to be rejected, therefore, and other means of analysis used.
Limited progress can be made by cross-tabulating variables to get an impression of their
relative importance. The correlations show that both wealth and income equality are linked
to trust, and by cross-tabulating the two we can see that wealth is more important than equality
(Table 3). Countries that are rich and egalitarian show the highest mean score on trust, rich
but inegalitarian countries are next, and income inequality makes little difference to poor
countries, because it is wealth not its distribution that matters for them. However, the standard
error within each group of countries is very large, and on statistical grounds we can only be
sure that the trust scores of rich and egalitarian countries are higher than those of poor
countries.
Table 3: Cross tabulation of wealth and inequality
Numbers of observations: 60 countries
 
Income level (gdp) 
Income inequality Rich 
(above median) 
Poor 
(below median) 
Egalitarian 
(below median) 
 
38 % trusting citizens 
(N = 22 countries) 
confidence 95%: +/- 6 points 
24 % trusting citizens 
(N = 10 countries) 
confidence 95%: +/- 5 points 
 
Inegalitarian 
(above median) 
29 % trusting citizens 
(N = 7 countries) 
confidence 95%: +/- 10 points 
20 % trusting citizens 
(N = 19 countries) 
confidence 95%: +/- 5 points 
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In other words cross-tabulation is of limited value, so we must try another way of
overcoming multi-collinearity problems. One method is to group variables which are
conceptually very close to each other and to factor analyse them to produce a single score. An
advantage of this method is also that the single factor is likely to be a more reliable and valid
indicator of a complex concept such as economic development or government quality. On the
other hand, care must be taken to group only those variables that are closely related
conceptually, so that the meaning of the single factor they deliver is clear. For example, the
five indicators of government performance (rule of law, government effectiveness, political
stability, freedom, and law and order) are all relate conceptually, and they all fit together
statistically. Therefore factor analysis is justified that produces a single overall score that is an
indicator of the ‘quality of government’, or ‘good government’ (see Appendix 2). Since this
composite measure already includes an assessment of corruption (via the subindex ‘rule of
law’), it covers also this aspect of good government, and hence our stand-alone measure of
corruption (the CPI) is not used in the following regressions.6
For the same theoretical and empirical reasons we combine the measure of wealth,
urbanization, life expectancy, size of the agricultural sector, and education enrolment. These
variables are closely associated conceptually with the more general ideas of modernization
and economic development and they also deliver a strong single factor, so this also passes the
theoretical and statistical test for factor analysis.7  However, in regression models the
economic development factor was not statistically significant after allowing for the effects of
Protestantism and ethnic fractionalisation (see Table 4). This puzzled us since wealth and
modernization are obviously closely associated, and our bi-variate results show wealth and
various indicators of modernization are also closely associated. A closer look at the bi-variate
relations shows why. The economic development/modernisation factor contains some
variables not strongly associated with trust (urbanisation, agriculture, and secondary school
enrolment) which serve to dilute the impact of the modernization factor, and conceal the full
power of the single wealth variable. When the latter is used in the regressions (Table 4) it
retains the strength of its association with trust. It  seems, therefore, that it is wealth that matters,
not necessarily the accompanying features of economic development and modernisation.
No other combination of variables fulfill our theoretical and empirical criteria for factor
anlaysis. Many of the remaining winning variables are inter-correlated but they fail either the
theoretical or statistical tests. For example, the cleavage measures have a theoretical link with
the anomia measures of social disturbance and disruption, but the resulting factor fails the test
of a KMO value of 0.6 or more. As a result we are left with the problem of multi-collinearity
among the remaining independent variables, and, in particular, an overlap between wealth
and the good government factor, both of which produce particularly strong bi-variate
correlations with trust in the 60 countries.
In response to these problems the rest of the paper follows the strategy of, first, organising
our variables according to exogeneity and endogeneity, and second, running a series of
regression models to establish which combination of different variables produces the best fit.
The first exogenous variable is the Protestant religion. The argument is not that Protestant
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theology or beliefs necessary pervade countries than are labelled Protestant now, but that the
religion has left a clear cultural imprint over the past centuries that has shaped a very wide
range of present-day features from economic development and forms of government, to
attitudes towards equality and corruption. The Protestant ethic facilitated the emergence of
capitalism in the seventeenth century, and Protestant countries are still among the richest, the
most democratic, and the least corrupt in the world today. Therefore, religious tradition is
treated as an exogenous variable that proceeds other variables historically, without being
influenced by them.
Table 4: OLS-Regressions on social trust
Model No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Beta (T-value) 
Protestantism+ .57*** 
(5.94) 
.50*** 
(4.62) 
.33** 
(2.74) 
.52*** 
(5.28) 
.59*** 
(4.82) 
.51*** 
(4.92) 
.59*** 
(4.96) 
.50*** 
(4.39) 
.37** 
(3.31) 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
-.40*** 
(-4.14) 
-.32** 
(-2.98) 
-.22* 
(-2.03) 
-.31** 
(-2.99) 
-.24* 
(-2.05) 
-.36** 
(-3.65) 
-.40*** 
(-4.12) 
-.37*** 
(-3.72) 
-.26* 
(-2.56) 
Modernisation  
(factor) 
 .18 
(1.50) 
       
Quality of 
government 
(factor) 
  .41** 
(3.14) 
      
Income inequality     -.25* 
(-2.35) 
     
Homicides     -.19 
(-1.64) 
    
Internal war      -.16 
(-1.49) 
   
Voluntary 
organisation 
membership 
      .05 
(.378) 
  
Government 
social spending 
       .13 
(1.11) 
 
National wealth         .36** 
(3.00) 
R2 (corrected) .46 .47 .53 .49 .50 .47 .49 .46 .52 
 
+ Dominant Protestant country or mixed Protestant-Catholic country.
Significance levels:  *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.
Numbers of observation: 60 countries.
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Similarly internal (civil) wars are treated as exogeneous because we measure them over a
fifty year period. If we accept the argument that civil war, in itself, is not as important as civil
war as an indicator of deep cleavages that go back historically, then contemporary wars can
be taken as a manifestation of historically important divisions within society. The ethnic
composition of countries is another exogeneous variable that changes only slowly over time.
Its stability makes it more plausible to assume that it has a long-term effect on social
developments, rather than the other way round. We are aware that wealthy countries that
guarantee human rights for minority groups may attract immigrants, and therefore good
government and wealth affect patterns of migration, but ethnic composition does not change
greatly in the short run, even in the modern era of mass population movements, and we feel
justified in classifying its as an exogenous variable.
When the three exogenous variables are run in the same OLS regression on trust,
Protestantism and ethnic composition turn out to be highly significant, but the power of civil
wars declines to insignificance. We therefore exclude it from the next set of OLS regressions
(Table 4) that include each endogenous variable in turn. These enable us to identify the
endogeneous variables that have an association with trust, and which of the exogeneous
variables have a direct effect and an indirect one that works through an endogeneous variable.
Model 1, which serves as the basic model, shows that Protestanism and ethnic fractionalisa-
tion together explain 46% of the variance in social trust, with religion having the biggest
impact.
In the subsequent regression models (2 to 9), each of the mediating variables is added to
the basic model in turn. These show:
1. In each regression, religious tradition remains a strong (and usually the strongest) pre-
dictor of social trust. However, the considerable drop in the influence of religion in
Model 3 indicates that the religious culture also has strong influence on the develop-
ment of government institutions and practices, with Protestant countries usually hav-
ing the highest good government scores. It seems, therefore, that Protestantism has a
direct association with trust, but also an indirect one that operates through its effect on
good government, wealth, and economic equality.
2. Ethnic fractionalisation remains significant in all the models, but it also loses much of
its strength when the good government variable is entered. This is probably because
ethnically diverse societies have more difficulty in generating and sharing public
goods (Alesina, Baqir and Easterly 1999; Goldin and Katz 1999), and in establishing
public institutions that work well (La Porta, et al., 1999).
3. After controlling for Protestantism and ethnic diversity, the impact of murder rates,
voluntary organisation membership, and government spending on health and educa-
tion is not significant. Models 3, 4, and 9 show that the statistical power of good gov-
ernment, income inequality, and national wealth retain their significance.
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Figure 1a: Explaining cross-national differences in social trust: main influences (all nations includ-
ing the Nordic countries)
Figure 1b: Explaining cross-national differences in social trust: main influences (excluding the five
Nordic countries)
Exogenous variables   Mediating variables  Dependent variable 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Ethnic 
homogeneity 
Religious tradition 
(Protestantism) 
Social trust 
Good government 
Economic well-being
Income equality 
 
Ethnic 
homogeneity 
Religious tradition 
(Protestantism) 
Social trust 
Good government 
Economic well-being
Income equality 
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These results suggest that the best model for explaining cross-national differences in social
trust (Figure 1a) includes two exogenous variables (Protestant traditions and ethnic compo-
sition) and three mediating variables (good government, wealth, and income inequality).
Because multi-collinearity is so high, especially between wealth (economic well-being) and
good government, one cannot put both variables in the same equation, and therefore cannot
say precisely how much influence each has. Nevertheless, it is possible to draw three
conclusions. First, both exogenous variables have a direct impact on social trust, of which
Protestant culture is the stronger. Second, among the endogenous variables, wealth and good
governance are more important than economic equality, but because wealthy countries have
good government it is not possible to disentangle their effects. Third, the indirect effects of
both Protestantism and ethnic fractionalisation flow mainly through good government and
national wealth, less so through economic equality.
5 Nordic exceptionalism?
It is clear that the Nordic countries are exceptional cases. Norway, Sweden and Denmark
have the highest levels of trust of any of our 60 nations, and Finland and Iceland rank in the
top ten, not far behind. All five countries are Protestant, rich, and ethnically homogeneous,
and all have high good government scores.  Scatterplots (Figure 2) illustrate the problem: the
Nordic nations have extreme scores on our most powerful explanatory variables, as well as
trust itself. Could it be that the Nordic countries, as outliers on all the important measures,
distort the results? Are the results truly global, or merely the result of Nordic exceptionalism?
To test this possibility we repeated the regressions, excluding the five Nordic countries (Table
5).
The results show that there is indeed some Nordic exceptionalism at work. Taking out the
Nordic countries from the regressions means reducing the explanatory power of the models
considerably, a loss of almost 20 percentage points in the basic model (from .46 to .29), and
between 14 percentage points and 21 percentage points in the other models (Table 5). Hence,
the amount of variance explained depends on whether the Nordic countries are included or
not. Nevertheless, taking out the Nordic countries does not eliminate the main conclusions of
the analysis. In all models except the third, Protestantism retains a significant association with
trust. It seems that ethnic fractionalisation is not so closely associated with trust outside the
Nordic societies for it loses its significance in three of the seven regression that include an
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Figure 2: Scatterplots of social trust against selected variables
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endogenous variable. Since there is very low, or virtually no ethnic diversity in Nordic
countries, it is difficult to know whether its contribution to the explanation of trust is global
or simply an artifact of its absence from the Nordic countries which happen to have none.
The important point to emerge from a comparison of Table 4 and Table 5 however, is that the
same set of five variables are directly or indirectly associated with trust, whether the Nordic
countries are included or not: Protestant religious traditions, ethnic fractionalisation, wealth,
good government, and income equality. In all cases income equality is the weakest variable,
Table 5: OLS-Regressions on social trust (excluding the five Nordic countries)
Model No. 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 
 Beta (T-value) 
Protestantism+ .49*** 
(4.06) 
.40** 
(3,10) 
.21 
(1.50) 
.45*** 
(3.79) 
.48** 
(4.82) 
.42** 
(3.30) 
.53*** 
(3.82) 
.45** 
(3.35) 
.28* 
(2.09) 
Ethnic 
fractionalisation 
-.36** 
(-3.02) 
-.27* 
(.2.04) 
-.14 
(-1.079) 
-.27* 
(-2.21) 
-.16 
(-1.11) 
-.31* 
(-2.58) 
-.38** 
(-3.01) 
.-.35** 
(-2.83) 
-.20 
(-1.66) 
Modernisation  
(factor) 
 .21 
(1.57) 
       
Quality of 
government 
(factor) 
  .48** 
(3.39) 
      
Income inequality     -.26* 
(-2.11) 
     
Homicides     -.27 
(-1.910) 
    
Internal war      -.20 
(-1.56) 
   
Voluntary 
organization 
membership 
      .02 
(.89) 
  
Government 
social spending 
       .09 
(.64) 
 
National wealth         .41** 
(3.04) 
R2 (corrected) .29 .28 .39 .31 .32 .28 .28 .26 .36 
 
+ Dominant Protestant country or mixed Protestant-Catholic country.
Significance levels:  *** p < .001, ** p < .01, * p < .05.
Numbers of observation: 55 countries.
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although it is statistically significant. The consistently robust nature of the findings allows us
to conclude that is not only Nordic exceptionalism that drives the results. The same patterns,
albeit in a somewhat weaker form, are found across the rest of the globe (Figure 1b).
6 Conclusion
To explain the origins of generalised social trust among sixty countries across the globe, we
started with a list of more than thirty independent variables covering a wide variety of social,
economic, and political indicators. Some of these are themselves derived from a number of
different but closely related measures. At the end of the analysis, however, we are left with
a simple but robust model.
Most of the independent variables fall quickly by the wayside, although all were
introduced for theoretically plausible reasons in the first place. Perhaps most important and
most surprising, none of the four measures of voluntary activity stood up to statistical tests,
in spite of the importance attached to them in a large body of writing, from de Tocqueville
onwards. Most religious measures turned out to be insignificant, as did our general composite
measure of economic development, and most of the measures of social strain and disruption.
In the end the internal (civil) war measure also disappears, perhaps because it is less important
in itself than as an indicator of deep underlying social cleavages that have an effect whether
or not civil war has actually broken out at some time in the past forty five years.
The composite indicator of economic development/modernisation also disappears after
controlling for ethnic homogeneity and Protestantism, although the single measure of GDP
per capita remains strong. There is the suggestion in the figures that rural societies tend to have
rather low levels of generalised trust, but urban scale and density have a neutral effect. This
is consistent with the suggestion that rural society may breed particularised but not generalized
trust, whereas large scale urban-industrial society has neither a positive nor a negative effect
on generalised trust. However, we need measures of both particular and general trust to test
this interpretation.
The highest levels of generalised social trust across the globe are closely associated with
a tight syndrome of religious/cultural, social, economic, and political characteristics.  These
may also be seen as a set of ethical/cultural, social, economic, and structural conditions in
which trust flourishes. Protestantism, but none of the other religions, forms the religious and
ethical foundations, probably because the Protestant ethic has had an historical imprint on a
culture of equality and the importance attached to persistently trustworthy behaviour. Ethnic
homogeneity is the social basis, presumably because people of the same ethnic background
find it easier to trust one another. Per capita GDP and income equality are the economic
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conditions. Wealthy and economically egalitarian societies are trusting societies, although
wealth seems to matter more than equality, except in the wealthiest countries where both make
a contribution. Good government is an essential structural basis of trust. Government,
especially corruption free and democratic government, seems to set a structure in which
individuals are able to act in a trustworthy manner and not suffer, and in which they can
reasonably expect that most others will generally do the same.
Trust is strongest where all these conditions are found in combination, and all these
conditions are found most clearly in Nordic countries. Sweden, Norway, Denmark, Finland
and Iceland are outliers on almost every important variable in the study. However, removing
them from the analysis does not alter the combination of variables associated with trust in the
remaining fifty five countries scattered across the globe, although it reduces their statistical
power substantially. The ethnic homogeneity of the Nordic countries also complicates matters
slightly. Nevertheless, in broad outline the models remain simple, consistent, and relatively
robust in terms of statistical significance, with or without the Nordic countries.
The strength of the direct and indirect association of ethnic homogeneity with trust raises
a question about exactly how general generalized social trust is. Particular trust is trust in
people we know or who are like us. Generalised trust is trust in people we may not know and
who may not be like us. The finding that ethnic homogeneity is strongly associated with
generalised trust suggests that it may not extend easily to all others in general, as opposed to
others who are like us, at least so far as ethnic background is concerned. In other words,
generalised trust is strongest where we have something in common with others, especially
where we are from the same ethnic background, which is exactly the condition associated
with particularised trust. It does not follow that generalised trust does not or cannot exist, only
that it is stronger where people have a shared ethnic identity, which makes it different from
particular trust in degree rather than kind.
Finally, we return to the problem of cause and effect. We can say little about this, partly
because our analysis is cross-sectional, but mainly because it is easy to envisage trust as either
a cause or effect or both in most of our statistical models. We can claim that Protestantism is
more of an historical cause than effect, and that the same is true of ethnic homogeneity insofar
as this predates the trust levels of the 1990s and changes rather slowly. But it is not possible
to order good government, GDP, or income equality in the same historical way, and therefore
it is not possible to disentangle their cause and effect relations.
In one important sense, however, this does not matter very much. It is evident that
generalised social trust is tightly integrated into a single syndrome of ethical/cultural, social,
economic, and structural conditions which are either theoretically or empirically linked, and
usually both (cf Inglehart 1997, 1999; Welzel, Inglehart and Klingemann 2003). Trust is all
of a single piece with these conditions, and it might well be both as pointless as it is impossible
to try to disentangle its intimate relations with them, even if we had the most complete time-
series data.
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Notes
1 We do not argue that all forms of social conflict are necessarily associated with low trust, but that this
is likely to be the case in general. According to Simmel and Coser, overlapping and interlocking
conflicts and cleavages do not threaten social cohesion, but can work as synthetic forces within soci-
eties. The theory is similar to the social capital claim that voluntary organisations that bridge impor-
tant social differences will help to generalised social trust between social groups.
2 Paxton (2002: 266) finds a strong negative correlation between industrialisation and trust.
3 Knack and Keefer’s cross-national study (1997: 1283. See also Delhey and Newton 2003) found no
relationship between social trust, on the one hand, and population size, population density, and ur-
banization, on the other, and Alesina and La Ferrara (2002: 221) found no association between social
trust and size of place in the USA. But House and Wolf 1978 and Putnam (2000: 205) find a positive
association between small scale communities and trust.
4 On the stability of national trust scores over time see also Knack and Keefer 1997: 1262.
5 The excluded countries are Bosnia, Montenegro, Northern Ireland, Puerto Rico, Serbia, and Taiwan.
6 The factor quality of government consists of (factor loadings in brackets): rule of law index (.98);
government effectiveness index (.97); political stability index (.93), cumulated freedom score (.84),
law and order index (.82) . The explained variance is 83%, and the KMO value .83.
7 The factor economic development consists of (factor loadings in brackets): employment size agricul-
ture (-.90); life expectancy (.90); GDP in purchasing power standards (.85), urbanisation (.79) and
secondary education enrolment ration (.64). The explained variance is 68%, and the KMO value .84.
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Appendix: Methods
Religious, linguistic and ethnic fractionalisation
The heterogeneity of the populations was measured by three fractionalisation measures
computed by Alesina et al (2002), who have used the Encyclopedia Britannica (2001) as their
main data source. Each of the three measures reflects the probability that two randomly
selected individuals from a population belong to different (religious, linguistic or ethnic)
groups. The higher the score, the more diverse (fractionalized) the population. In perfectly
homogenous countries, the probability is 0. Alesina et al (2002: 5) note that in general the
definition of religions and languages is much easier than for ethnicities, with the latter
involving a combination of racial and linguistic characteristics.
Political freedom
The most-widely used measures are the Freedom House ratings for political rights and civil
liberties (see www.freedomhouse.org) which, for the purposes of this work, were combined
into a single political freedom score. The higher the score the greater the freedom. Because
it may be some time before political freedom can create a climate of trust, a measure for the
mean level of freedom over 20 years (1976-1996) was also constructed. For countries newly
established during this time period, the scores of the predecessor country were taken for the
missing years.
Government expenditure
Government expenditure for health and education as proportion of GDP are combined as a
proxy for total government social expenditures. The figures are derived from Human
Development Report (2002).
Good government
The Human Development Report (2002) provides a collection of subjective indicators of the
quality of government, including:
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• An index political stability and lack of violence is taken from the World Bank. This is
the perceived likelihood of destabilization caused by ethnic tensions, armed conflict,
social unrest, terrorist threat, internal conflict, fractionalization of the political spec-
trum, constitutional changes, and military coups. The World Bank collects informa-
tion about these indicators from a variety of sources including the Economist Intelli-
gence Unit and Business Environment Risk Intelligence.
• An index of law and order is taken from the International Country Risk Guide
(ICRG), and measures legal impartiality and popular observance of the law, as
judged by in-house expert opinion.
• The index of the rule of law is taken from the World Bank. The measure covers the
extent of black markets, enforceability of private and government contracts, corrup-
tion in banking, crime and theft as obstacles to business, losses from and costs of
crime, and the unpredictability of the judiciary. The World Bank collects information
from a variety of sources including the Economist Intelligence Unit and the PRS
Group.
• The index of government effectiveness is taken from the World Bank and measures
bureaucratic quality, transaction costs, quality of public health care and government
stability. The World Bank aggregates information from a variety of sources including
the PRS Group, Freedom House and Business Environment Risk Intelligence.
Corruption
The measure for corruption is the 1996 Corruption Perceptions Index (CPI) from Transpar-
ency International (www.transparency.org). The CPI estimates the extent of corruption
among officials, as judged by experts from business, academia, and in risks analysis. For our
purpose, the scale from 10 (very clean) to 0 (very corrupt) was reversed, so that higher values
indicate more corruption. The first Transparency International figures were collated in 1995,
but covered only 41 countries, so later CPI figures were taken for the remaining countries. CPI
scores do not fluctuate much in the short term, so later data are a good proxy for 1996. The
methodology of the CPI is explained in Lambsdorff (2002).
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Internal war, external war
Two variables covering armed conflicts in the post-WWII period are constructed from data
presented by the ‘Arbeitskreis Kriegsursachenforschung’ (AKUF). Internal war combines
‘anti-regime’, ‘secession and autonomy’ and ‘other inner-state’ wars. External war combines
‘international war’ and ‘de-colonization war’. The time-series starts in 1946. For both
variables, the number of years since the end of the last war is entered, so that countries with
wars ending in 1946 are coded ‘1’, and countries with a war going on in 1996 are coded ‘51’.
Countries with no war experience after WWII are coded ‘0’. On the basis of this information
several dummy variables were constructed. For internal wars, countries with any internal war
after WWII are coded ‘1’, countries without any internal war ‘0’. Similarly, dummy variables
are constructed for internal wars within the last five years, and internal wars within the last
two years (including the survey year 1996). The same procedure was applied to external wars.
The definition of war used by the AKUF is that of Kende, which is generally regarded as the
international benchmark for armed conflict research (for more information see www.akuf.de).
Income inequality
The Gini Index of income inequality, taken from Human Development Reports, ranges from
0 (absolute equality, everybody has the same income share) to 1 (absolute inequality, one
single citizen gets the whole country’s income). The higher the Gini-Index, the more unequal
is the income distribution. In some cases country data are not available for 1996, so figures
for 1989 to 1995 are used instead. Once again, this is an acceptable way of filling in country
data because Gini indices usually do not change much over short periods of time.
Lethal accidents
Lethal accidents are measured as deaths per 100.000 inhabitants due to accidents, as recorded
on medical registers of causes of death.
Homicides
Rates are measured as murders per 100.000 inhabitants, as recorded on medical registers of
causes of death.
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Voluntary organisation membership
Information on membership in voluntary associations is provided by the WVS. Respondents
were asked for active membership, inactive membership or non-membership of the following
associations: churchs, sports club, arts organisations, trade unions, parties, environmental
groups, professional organizations, charities, and other associations. Four measures of
voluntary activity are derived from this information : proportion of respondents who are (1)
active members of any association; (2) active members of three or more associations; (3)
members (either active or inactive) of any association; and (4) members (either active or
inactive) of three or more associations. Due to obviously invalid figures, Armenia, Ghana,
Nigeria and Pakistan had been set to ‘missing’.
It should be noted that these measures of organisational activity are aggregated individual
scores for countries, not structural or system measures, such as the quality of governance,
economic freedom, or the Gini index of economic equality. However, it proved impossible
to find good and reliable system measures of the voluntary sector. We are forced to use
aggregated individual scores from the WVS as the nearest approximation to proper system
level or structural measures.
Dominant religion
Depending on their dominant religious tradition, countries are classified as Protestant,
Catholic, mixed Protestant/Catholic, Orthodox, Islam, Buddhist, or Hindu. For the purpose
of analysis, dummy variables have been constructed, using the largest group of countries –
the Catholic countries – as the reference group.
PAGE 34
SOCIAL TRUST: GLOBAL PATTERN OR NORDIC EXCEPTIONALISM?
Table A-1: Description of variables collected for analysis
* Item has been taken from Ruud Veenhoven’s States of Nations-Database. We are grateful to Ruud
Veenhoven for sharing his database with us.
No. Variable Unit N Year Min Max Mean SD 
[1] Social Trust % trusting 60 1996, 1990 3 65 28 14.2 
[2] Total population  Millions 60 1996 .3 1232 72 198.1 
[3] Population density  Persons per sqkm 60 1996 2 834 117 136.0 
[4] Ethnic fractionalisation Probability measure, 0-1 60 1983-2001 0 0.85 0.32 0.22 
[5] Linguistic fractionalisation Probability measure, 0-1 59 1983-2001 0 0.87 0.29 0.25 
[6] Religious fractionalisation Probability measure, 0-1 60 1983-2001 0 0.86 0.45 0.22 
[7] Foreign born population % foreign born 43 1990-1995 .1 23 4.5 5.1 
[8] Urbanization % urban population 60 1996 17 97 65 17.8 
[9] Size of agriculture % employment in primary  
sector  
58 1996 2 72 19 17.5 
[10] Life expectancy at birth in years 60 1995 51.4 80.0 72 5.9 
[11] Education secondary net enrolment ratio  1996     
[12] National wealth GDP per capita in PPP 60 1995 1004 28752 10790 8134.4 
[13] Freedom House Score 7 = free, 1 = not free 60 1996 1 7 5.5 1.5 
[14] Freedom House score, 
cumulated 20 years 
7 = free, 1 = not free, 
averaged 
60 1976-1996 1.6 7 4.6 1.9 
[15] Former/actual communist 1 = yes 60 1945-1996 0 1 .35 .5 
[16] Political Corruption (CPI) 10 = highly corrupt, 0 = free 60 1996 .6 9.3 5.0 2.6 
[17] Government expenditure  
health + education 
% of GDP 60 1996 1.5 15 9.2 3.4 
[18] Income inequality 0-100 (absolute inequality) 58 Around 1995 23 60 37 10.4 
[19] Suicide rate Per 100.000 35 1994-98 .4 80 6.6 12.1 
[20] Lethal accidents Per 100.000 49 1997 11.5 104.2 43.3 23.0 
[21] homicides Per 100.000 49 1997 0 130 10.4 20.5 
[22] Internal war Last year after 1945 60 1945-1996 45 96 63 23.0 
[23] Internal war after 1945 1 = yes (dummy) 60 1945-1996 0 1 .42 .5 
[24] Internal war after 1991 1 = yes (dummy) 60 1991-1996 0 1 .3 .46 
[25] Internal war after 1995 1 = yes (dummy) 60 1995-1996 0 1 .17 .38 
[26] External war Last year after 1945 60 1945-1996 45 96 53.6 17.1 
[27] External war after 1945 1 = yes (dummy) 60 1945-1996 0 1 .23 .43 
[28] External war after 1995 1 = yes (dummy) 60 1995-1996 0 1 .05 .22 
[29] Voluntary organization 
membership 
% members 55 1996, 1990 11 96 61 21.2 
[30] Voluntary organization 
membership 3+ 
% members in 3 or more 
organisations 
55 1996, 1990 0 59 20 25.8 
[31] Voluntary organization 
active membership 
% active members 55 1996, 1990 2 79 34 19.3 
[32] Voluntary organization 
active membership 3+ 
% active members in 3 or  
more organisations 
55 1996,1990 0 35 6 7.1 
[33] Political stability/lack of  
violence 
Index, +2.5 (best) to -2.5 60 2000-2001 -1.45 1.61 .42 .83 
[34] Law and order Index, 6 (best) to 0 58 2000-2001 1 6 4.2 1.46 
[35] Rule of law Index, +2.5 (best) to -2.5 60 2000-2001 -1.13 1.91 .48 .94 
[36] Government effectiveness Index, +2.5 (best) to -2.5 60 2000-2001 -1.10 1.93 .42 .94 
Sources: 
[1] World Value Survey, waves II + III [18] Human Development Report 1996 
[2]; [3] United Nations: Demographic Yearbook 1996 [19] Human Development Reports (various volumes) 
[4]; [5]; [6] Alesina et al. 2002 [20] ; [21] United Nations: Demographic Yearbook 1998* 
[7] World Culture Report* [22] – [28] AKUF web resources 
[8] Human Development Report 1996 [29] – [32] World Value Survey, waves II + III 
[9] OECD: Labour Force Statistics [33] – [36] Human Development Report 2002 
[10]; [11] Human Development Report 1998 [16] Transparency International web resources 
[12] Human Development Reports (various volumes) [17] Human Development Reports (various volumes) 
[13]; [14] Freedom House web resources [18] Human Development Report 1996 
[15] Own entries [19] Human Development Reports (various volumes) 
[16] Transparency International web resources [20] ; [21] United Nations: Demographic Yearbook 1998* 
[17] Human Development Reports (various volumes)   
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